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Recently economists have been paying increased attention to the dif
ferences in the human capital invested in men and women in order to accol.lllt
for some part of the male-female earnings differential. 1

At the same time,

economists primarily interested in the determinants of population change
have developed models which demonstrate that family size is only one dimen
sion of household child investment, that the parent'al decisions concerning
the desired quantity of children are closely related to decisions concerning
the level of resources devoted to each prospective child, or child quality.

2

Empirical analysis in this area, however, has been for the most part confined
to testing the fertility implications of these models

3

and no attention has

been paid to the possibility that the family resources invested in children
may differ along sex lines.

Conlisk (1969) has shown that the variation in

one proxy for the quality investment in children, school enrollment, is domi
nated by changes in family variables.

That the urban enrollment rates of

male and female teen-agers have been significantly different, as displayed
in Table I for recent decades, may thus be evidence of such household-level
sex-specific

differential child investment, though not necessarily of intra

family "discrimination."

To the extent that these early differentials are

important, an analysis of the determinants of sex-specific household invest
ment may provide some further understanding of the observed sex-differentials
in the earnings of adults.
In this study, it is shown that not only the recent decline in birth
rates, but the differential levels of and changes in male and female teen-age
school rates, and the rise in per-pupil schooling expenditures

4

are mainly
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the joint products of changes in parameter s pertainin g to the child in
vestment decisions of parents, particula rly women in the home.

In part I,

a household productio n model of the family's child investmen t behavior
which explicitl y considers the possibili ty of the different ial allocatio n
of resources to male and female children is outlined and the differen tial
influence s of the education al attainmen t and time values of the husband
and the wife on the quality and quantity of children and on the derived
demand for the goods used in the productio n of these commoditi es are analy~ed.
In part II, the implicati ons derived from the framework described in part I
are tested empirical ly with aggregate state data from the 1960 Census of
Populatio n:

proxies for household productio n variables are related to the

average completed family size, the male and female teen-age school enroll
ment rates, and the public school expenditu res of residents of urban areas.

I.

The Theoretic al Framework
a.

The Productio n of Child Services

The fundamen tal insight of the household productio n analysis in its
general form is that the ultimate objects of consumer satisfact ion, called
"commod ities," are produced in the hane with goods purchased in the market
and the time of the family members.

In order to
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.
highlight the sex-specific
child investment decisions of the h ouseh o ld , in thj
analysis the set of commodities is aggregated into four-- the
quantity of children N, the quality per child of female children,QF ,
the quality per child of male children, QM,and S, a composite of
all other commodities produced in the home which are alternative
sources of satisfaction for the family.

It is assumed that the

two parents desire to maximize their lifetime utility with respect
to these commodities and thus the stochastic and sequential nature
of child investment is not considered.
If f is the proportion of total children who are female,
I

5

then

I

the total amount of female child services produced in the household
is fN~F; total male child services is similarly (1-f) NQM.
The production of these child services and Sare described by the
household production functions (1), (2), and (3)

(1)

(3)

where the production inputs in each commodityiare the time of the
husband and wife, THi, TWi, and purchased goods Xi;

the E. are vectors
1

of "environmental" variables, which influence the productivity of
the inputs but have no direct effect on the amount of commodities
produced.

Two of these"E" variables, the education of e·ach parent

are discussed below.
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Dividing functions (1) and (2) by the quantitie s of female and
male children respectiv ely yields (4) and (5), the relation between
average inputs of parental time, tWi'tHi' and goods,x 1 , and the amounts
of quality per male and female child:

5

(4)

Q
M

= g/XM
-l(l-f)N,

THM
TWM
( 1- f) N , ( 1-f ) N,

~

1M

= g( xM , tWM , tHM ,

1M)

(5)

Quality per child can thus be represent ed by the total resources devoted to,
or the resource intensity of, each child, which is assumed to be subject to
the choice of the parents.

Note that the amounts of inputs per unit of

quality per child may differ between male and female children if the technical
propertie s of the productio n functions differ, i.e., if raising ma·le and female
children to the same level of quality efficient ly requires different
combinati ons and amounts of inputs.
unit of child services,

.The ''.price" of an additiona l

male or female, is the cost of producing that

additiona l unit, i.e., marginal cost.

This cost is equal to the sum

of the costs of the additiona l productio n inputs required, which is
in turn related to the amounts and prices of those inputs.

Under

the assumptio n of the linear homogenit y of the productio n functions ,
every unit of quality per child requires the same amounts of time
and goods (for efficient productio n), thus the marginal (=average )
quantitie s of inputs are tWi' tHi' and xi.

If Pw, pH, and pxi are the

prices of the wife's time, the husband's time, and the price index
of the composite good used in the productio n of commodity i, then
the shadow prices of male and female child services, n1!'r a.nd .,,."M, are••
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(6)

(7)

As can be

seen, if the production technologies of male and female

child services are dissimilar, their shadow prices will also differ.
commodity, S, which is also

' Similarly, the

produced in the household, has its own shadow price:

(8)

Since both the quantity of children, N, and the per-child
sex-specific quality commodities, QF and QM, enter the utility function
of the family separately (are rmique sources of satisfaction), their
shadow prices must be distinguished in order to describe the consump
tion behavior of the parents.

The shadow price of quality per

female child is the increase in the total expenditures on child ser
vices necessitated by a unit increase in the production of QF holding
constant the number of female children. Since total expenditures
on child services is Nf QF~F + N(l-f) QM~M , the shadow price of QF
is therefore equal to Nf~F' the fixed number of female children
the shadow price of female child services.

times

Thus the larger the

number of female children, fN, the more "expensive" is female
quality per child since the additional unit of quality must be
allocated to every female child.

Similarly, the shadow price of

QM, quality per male child,is (1-f)N•M and is a positive function of
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the quantity of male children.
The shadow price of the total quality of children, N, the
increase in total expenditures on child services induced by a unit
increase in the number of children, for given levels of quality per
child, is f'QF,rF +. (1-f) QM 11'M ; the Jti.gher the amounts of child
quality chosen, the more costly are increases in family size.
The family family maximizes its utility function (9) subject to
constraints on the lifetime resources of goods and time:

the

total amount of market goods purchased cannot exceed the lifetime
earnings of the

(9)

two parents and the amount of time each parent spends in household
production and in the labor market, LW and LH,must not be greater
then the total time available to each~Tw and TH.

If it is assmned

that both the husband and the wife spend some part of their lifetime in the labor force for the purpose of earning income, 7 at life
time wage rates WH and WW, then the lifetime expenditure eonstraint is:

(10)
The parental time constraints are:
(11)

(12)
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The time and expenditure constraints (10), (11), and (12)

be

can

combined into one "full income"constraint, (13), by noting that goods
can be traded for time in the labor market at the market wage
rates and that the prices of time of the husband and wife_, PW and PH,
are equal to their market wages , wH and wF.

8

(13)
Necessary conditions for achieving maximum satisfaction from
the consumption of the four commodities subject to the full income
constraintfa.re that the ratio of the marginal utilities
of each pair of commodities equal the ratio of their shadow prices,
as defined above; i.e.:

UQ
us

F

=

fNnF

UQ

UN
us -

(1-f) NnM

(16)

fQFnF + (1-f) QM 1TM
(l-f)N1rM

uN = fQP 'll'F + (1-f) QM
UQ

(18)

(15)

'It's

us

'It's

UN= fQF,rF + (1-f) QM'll'M
us
ns

=

M

(14)

M

(17)

fNnF

F
UQ
UQ

'II'

F

M

f1rF

=

(1-f) 'll'M

(19)

Before analyzing in more detail the roles of the husband and
wife in the optimal production of the commodities, a number of
implications for child quality investment and fertility can be
drawn from these

first-order

conditions.

First,from expressions
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(17) and (18), it can be

seen that any phenomenon which reduces

fertility (N) will also diminish the shadow prices of child quality.
If the. use of more efficient birth control techniques lowers actual
fertility, for given levels of desired family size, then the
greater the efficiencywith which contraception is utilized the
higher will be the levels of quality per child.

If the educational

attainment of the wife is positively associated with contraceptive ef
ficiency 9 then her schooling should be both negatively correlated
with fertility and positively correlated with child quality.

The

human capital embodied in the parents, however, may have other
influences on child investment, through home productivity and
"taste" effects, and these are discussed below.
A second inference that can be drawn from conditions (14)through
(19)pertains to the differential investment in children of different
sex.

Ratio (19} shows that the shadow price of

QM relative to QF depends on the relative amounts of male and female
children; thus, for instance, families with a greater proportion
of female children will desire a higher level of male than female
child quality.

Since in the aggregate population f

-.:=::.

5, it would

s.eenr that only differential preferences for QF and QM, or technolog

ical differences, could result in different levels of male and
female quality in the total population.

However, evidence exists

that , at least in some societies families whose first offspring are
10

female bear more total children than families whose first child is male.
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This "son-biased" behavior would produce a negative correlation
between N, total fertility, and (1-f), the proportion of children
who are male in these societies and would result in 1) a lower
average quality per child, since the shadow prices of both QF
and QM would be higher in these societies due to the higher
number of children, and 2) a greater level of quality per male
child than per female child, since f would probably exceed 1-f
and thus the average shadow price of QF would be greater than
that of QM

11

,~

Preference for quantity of males thus also results

in higher investment in male children even if tastes for QF and
QM are not dissimilar.
A third implication of these shadow price relationships is
that compulsory education laws, to the extent that they are effective,
that is, that they actually induce a rise in. quality per child
beyond the level deemed optimal by the parents, should have a negative
effect on fertility since the shadow price of quantity would be
increased with the legislated increases in QF and QM.

Such

schooling legislation thus makes children more "expensive".
Moreover, these laws may have a differential impact on male and
female quality levels due, perhaps, to differential enforcement
according to sex.

This phenomenon, the existence of which is

tested in Part II, would be an example of societal and not familial bias.
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A final implication derived from the dependence of the shadow
price of child quantity on the desired level of child quality is
that "pure" income increases will raise the shadow price of
quantity if preferences are biased towards child quality, that is,
if the pure income elasticity of child quality exceeds that of quantity:
Thus even if nF and nM remain constant, a rise in income could
lead to increases in the quality investment in children and a
decline in fertility if the negative shadow price effect was st~onger
than the pres\lllled positive pure income effect with respect to the
total quantity of children. 12
Changes in nF, nM' TI , for constant levels of real income, 13
8
however, may have stronger effects on the decisions concerning the
production

of male and female child quality and n\llllbers of children.

While such prices are not directly observable, the prices of their
components , parental time and goods, can be measured.

In the next

section the relationships between the wages and schooling levels
of the husband and wife and the demand for n\llllbers of children,
sex-specific child qualitY., and the mixture of imputs used in the
production of these commodities are analyzed.
b.

Child Investment and the Parents

Changes in the price of time (wage rates) of the husband and
wife will result in shifts in the proportions of commodities con
sumed if such changes alter the child services prlces, nf and TIM'
andthe price of S,n

8

•

An increase in the wage rate of either parent

would raise all three prices, since parental time is assumed to be

-11:...

used in the production of every commodity, but the ratio

of the

prices would remain unchanged only if the value shares of parents'
time in every~- were equal.

14

1

The effect of variations in paren-

tal wage rates on the consumption mix will thus depend on the
relative earnings shares, or time-value intensities, of each
parent in the three ~'s

and on the effects of changes on the ~'s

on the consumption of each commodity.

Moreover, because the rela

tive time intensities of the husband and wife may differ, the
effects of changes in their respective wages may also be dissimilar.
Making some plausible assumptions about the effects of changes in
the commodity shadow prices and about the ranking of parental time
intensities among the commodities yields a number of empirically
testable hypothesis concerning the magnitude and dmrection of the
,influence of changes in the wife's price of time relative to that
of the husband on the investment in children-- on the relative
amounts of child quantity and child quality per male and female
child produced by the family.
The (compensated) effect of a change in the w~fe's wage on N,
'the total mumber of children desired, expressed in elasticity terms,is
(20)

where aFW'aMW are the wife's earnings shares in the shadow price of
male and female child services, a Wis the wife's earnings share in
5
15
n , and E
are the elasticities of total child quantity with
5
N, ni
respect to changes in nF and nM.

If it can be assumed that increases

in the shadow prices of male and female child services decrease the
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demand for the quantity of children, i.e. EN

'If

' F

,.

EN

, ,rM

< O,

16

then

expression 2Q ) will be negative if both male and female child
services are more time-value intensive (with respect to the wife's
fime) than S.
The assumption that child services production is intensive in
the wife's time is not only intuitively appealing but is consistent
with the evidence of a negative effect of the presence of children
in the home on the labor force participation of married women found
by Mincer (1962~, Cain (1966), Bowen and Finegan (1969), and Smith
(1972)-- women who choosemore children spend more time in house
hold production.

Thus it would be expected that increases in the

wife's wage would reduce desired levels of family size.
The relation between changes in the husband's wage and N is
of similar

form to expression ( 20 )except that the a' s refer to the

value intensities of the husband's time in the shadow prices of
child services and S.

It can be seen that if the husband distributes

his time equally in the production of the household commodities,
aFH

~

aMH ~a.SH , or if his participation in household production

is not great, then changes in his price of time will have a neg
ligible influence on fertility.

Evidence

that the husband spends

more time in the production of non-child commodities (S) than in
child investment, means that an increase in the husband's wage
may even have a small Positive effect on family size. 17
The assumption of greater differences in the wife's time-value
intensities between commodities (specialization in child investment)
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and of her greater participation. in household production in general,
compared to the husband's allocation of timeJmeans that it is
variations in the wife's price of time which will also dominate
Ex

changes in the levels of quality per male and female child.

pressions ( 21 and (22 ), derived from the model, display the effects
of changes in the wife's wage, in elasticity terms, on the demand
for female, ( 2i) and male (22'), quality per child:
(21)

(22)

, are cross elasticities, expressing the effect of

and EQ.

El'L,

;/\-.

'<F,'1111

a change in the parent's demand for the level of male (female)
quality with respect to a change in the shadow price of female
(male) child services, and are positive if it is assumed that
male and female child quality are substitutes in consumption.

Thus,

if increases in the shadow price_of male and female child services
decrease quality per child as well as the quantity of children
(E0 .n. , E
·"M' .M

< Q ) and the substitutibility between male and female

q.,n F

qualxty levels is not large, the wife's wage would be negatively
correlated with the quality of children, ceteris paribus.
Expressions (21) and (22) also show that differences in the re
sponse of quality levels per child to variations in the wife's wage,
for male

and female children, i.e., differential investment in
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children according to sex, could be due to any combination of
two factors:

1) preferencesfor Qr and QM differ, that is

aMW = arw but EQf;r # E(m-~M and 2) the time value intensities
•, of male and female child services are dissimilar, E(L,

"'t,-rrf

but aMW 1 arw·

= EQ.

l'\'7f.11

The latter would be true if the household production

technologies of Qr and QM were not identical, presumably because
of innate differences between the sexes; the former corresponds
more closely to the notion of "discrimination", but at the house
hold level.
The greater influence of changes in the wife's price of time
CO!lpared to that of the husband on child investment also applies
to the relative effects of parental human capital.

Education,

as an environmental production variable, may influence the shadow
price of the commodities if it alters the marginal productivity
of time in household production.

If education raised the pro

ductivity of time equally in the production of every commodity 18
then the co?Te1ations between educational attainment and child
quality and quantity would be opposite to those characterizing the
wage rate-child investment relationships; high levels of the wife's
sbhooling would be associated with high levels of fertility and
child quality.

The prediction of a positive association between

fertility and the wife's educational attainment based on the
household production efficiency hypothesis, however, is opposite to
that

arising from the notion that contraceptive efficiency and

the wife's schooling

are positively correlated, as discussed in

-15-

the preceeding section.

If schooling were not also correlated

with "tastes", the estimated sign of the female schooling coefficient in
a

fertility regression also containing wage rates would indicate

which

education effect is dominant.

The level of the husband's

schooling, if household production efficiency were the only influence
on education, would have little effect on child investment given
the small amount and even distribution of his time devoted to
household production.
Changes in the value of the wife's price of time and her
educational attainment will also influence the allocation of the
production jzi.puts used in child investment.

An increase in t.he

wife's wage, for instance, would induce her to substitute market
goods for her more expensive time per unit of child services
produced.

This positive relation between the wife's wage and the

per-unit goods input used in the production of male and female
child services would be stronger the more time-value intensive
are child services· 1

9

and the greater the ease with which goods

and time can be substituted in household production.

The response

of t h e ~ amount of child quality goods input demanded due to
changes in the female wage will, however, als~ depend on the change in
level, or number of units, of child services produced, the substitution effect in consumption .• · Given the assumption of the timevalue intensity of child services, the latter effect will be negative
and may:· ·thus wholly or partly offset the positive production substitution effect.

The net influence of a change in female wage

the
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rates on the derived demand for expenditures on child quality will
thus depend on the magnitude of the consumption and production
elasticities.

Increases in the wage rates of women could result

in both increased expenditures per child and a decline in the demand
for child quality.
The education of the wife, to the extent that formal schooling
increases the productivity of her time in home production, would
be negatively correlated with the per-unit amo\ll'l.t of goods used in the
production of child services -- more productive time would be
substituted for goods.

Since the household productivity effect

of education also results in a positive association between the
level of time-intensive child quality and schooling, the net effect
of the educational attainment of women on the derived demand for
total child expenditures is also ambiguous.

Higher levels of schooling

of women could thus be associated with higher quality children
but less expenditures per child.
C.

pummary
Before proceeding to the next section, in which measures of

fertility, male and female child quality, and expenditures on children
are regressed on proxies for the household production variables
implicated in the prece ding· analysis , it may be useful to review
some of the empirical "predictions" derived from the theoretical
framework:
1)

Female should dominate male variables in all the regression
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equations, that is the educational attainment and wage variables
pertaining to the wife should exert more influence on the three
measures of child investment than do those pertaining to the husband.
2)

The partial correlations between the female wage rate

and fertility and male and female ·quality are most likely to be
negative if women specialize in child investment-; the wage effects
on the sex-specific quality measures may differ if either preferences
ftastes, for male and female child quality differ or their production
characteristics ("technologies") are dissimilar.
3)

The influence of female education on fertility depends

on the relative strengths of the contraceptive knowledge and home
productivity effects of schooling.

If the schooling of the wife

and the knowledge of efficient birth control techniques are posi
tively associated, then female education will have a negative
impact on the birth rate and a positive effect on quality per
child.

If schooling increases the productivity of the wife's time

in home production, then female educational attainment should be
positively correlated with both·fertility and child quality.

If

education effects are operative, the female schooling

both

coefficient

,ln

the fertility regression equation should be al

gerbraically less then its counterpart in the child quality regressions.
4)

The relation between the wife's wage and the derived demand

for total expenditures per child may be positive even if the demand
for quality per child declines with increases in the wife's price
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of time, if there is strong substitution of goods for time in the
household production of child services.
5)

Compulsory schooling laws, if they succeed in riasing child

quality above the levels otherwise desired by parents, should have
a negative influence on family size and may also be an institutional,
or non-household, source of bias with respect to sex-specific child
investment if they are enforced in a discriminatory manner.
II.

Empirical Analysis
a)

The Data and the Dependent Variables

The preceding framework implied that family size, male and female
child quality intensity, and the aggregated goods used as inputs in
child quality production are all dimensions of child investment
jointly related to the variables pertaining to the parental decision20
makers. Thus, to test the implications of the model, empirical counterparts to these theoretical constructs are used in four separate ordinary
least squares regression equations corresponding to the four child in
vestment measures.

An important advantage of considering a number of

aspects of child investment simultaneously is that another dimension is
added to the test of the model -- the consistency of the signs of the
variable coefficients across equations. 21
The unit of observation used in all equations is the state and all
data pertain to urban residents 22 as defined in the 1960 Census of
Population.

While the household production model of child investment

has been formulated in terms of an individual family, the model is
tested on aggregate data because aggregate samples have two important
.
23
advantages over data consisting of individual observations
..
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1)

The price of time of women in individual families is often unknown

and endogenously related to the proxies for child investment because
many women, at a given point in time, are not in the labor market;
the existence of separate labor markets in urban areas between
states provides estimates of female wage rates and thus the average
opportunity cost of time for women in each state.

2)

Variation

in tastes, high among individual families, is considerably attenuated
when aggregate population averages are utilized.

This phenomenon

is important because among individual families, preferences for
child services influence labor force participation and thus the
relevant opportunity costs of child investment. 24
Of the four dependendent variables representing different aspects
of child investment, that used in the fertility regression is the
number of children ever born per 1,000 urban married women aged
35-44 (CEB).

This age-cohort was chosen because these women are

likely to have completed their childbearing and thus the fertility
measure corresponds closely to the lifetime child quantity variable
in the model.

Measures of the completed fertility of older cohorts

were not used because the effects of mortality on these surviving
women might produce biases in the estimated regression coefficients.

-20-

The sex-specifi c child quality variables, QM and QF , are
measured by the school enrollment rates of male and female urban
teen-agers aged 15-18 (ENRM, ENRF) 25

The theory of human capital

investment 26 suggests that those parents who desire high quality
children will invest more in them at every stage of the child's
life cycle, at home and in school; thus children's schooling and
the household investment in children should be positively correlated.
To· the extent that schooling and time-intens ive household child
investment are substitutes , however, the coefficient s of the wife's
wage variables will be biased upwards.
Aggregate current state public school expenditure s per pupil
in average daily attendance in urban districts (EXP) is the proxy
used to represent the goods input in the production of child quality. 27
It is assumed that families are able to influence the level of these
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expenditures on education through either the political process
or migration.

The omission of private school expenditures from

this educational expenditure measure may bias towards zero all
the estimated coefficients of the variables in the expenditure
regression equations if public school expenditures understate
total expenditures on schooling more for high then for low ex
penditure-demand states.
b.

Independent Variables

The measure of the opportunity cost of time for women aged
35-44 used in all the regressions

(FW) is the average wage of

all women in that age group who worked-- their annual income divided
by an estimate of the number of weeks worked during the year.
This computed wage is preferable to annual female earnings because
time spent in the labor force and thus total female income will
be negatively correlated with child investment,since such activity
is time intensive.

Thus a negative correlation between female

earnings and child investment variables would not represent the
effect of the wife's price of time on fertility or child quality
but the influence of tastes for children on earnings.

The wage

coefficient may, however, be biased downward because women with
higher preferences for child services would tent to have less labor
force experience, and thus less human capital, for given levels of
schooling, then other women.

The "depreciation" of the market

s k 1·11so f t h ese women wh 1le
•
spec1al1z1ng
• • •
in
• home production
·

28

could
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also produce a negative co,;,relation between female wage rates and
measures of child investment even in the absence of the substi
tution effects predicted by the household production model.

To

the extent that aggregation reduces the variety in taste~, however,
this latter consideration is unimportant-- taste dispersion between
states is much less strong than between individuals.
The male price of time (MW) is constructed in the same manner
as the female variable.

The parental education measures (EDF, EDM)

are the number of years of schooling completed by males and females
aged 35-44.

These wage and schooling variables represent the basic

household production parameters whiGh are used in each equation.
Infant mortality (IM) is also entered in all the regressions
to capture the effect of child survival probability on number of
births and on child quality.

While the sign of the coefficient of

this variable in the fertility equation is ambiguous-- decreases
in infant mortality both increase the demand for surviving children
(if infant deaths are costly) and decrease the number of births
needed to attain any given family size,

increases in the likelihood

that children will survive and become adults should raise the amount
of resources invested in them.
To assess the differential strength of compulsory schooling laws on
sex-specific teen-age school enrollment or child quality; and thus on family
size, the minimum lawful school-leaving age for each state (EDLAW) is entered
in all regressions.

Edwards (1970) found that these laws had

differential effects on teen-age male and female school enrollment

-23-

rates, being more effective in boosting the rates of teen-age
males.
The proportio n of urban non-white s aged 35-44 (NONW) is
included to test if, ceteris paribus, whites and non-white s differ
with respect to their child investmen t behavior.

Conlisk (1969)

found that non-white s have significa ntly lower enrollmen t rates
than whites and McMahon (1970), Gustman and Pidot (1973) and
DeTray (1973) concluded that non-white s also spend less per child
for education al purposes; all these results, however, were obtained
from equations whose specifica tions differ from those used here.
In addition to these variables , which are included in all
four regressio n equations , the urban unemployment rate for the
age groups 15-24 (U) and the wage rate of the non-agric ultural
unskilled (OPW) were entered in the enrollmen t equations to control
for the opportun ity costs of schooling .

It would be expected that,

for given desired levels of child quality, enrollmen t rates of
teen-ager s would be higher in those states where teen-age unemploy
ment was high, since the probabili ty of getting work in those
states would be small, and where the relevant opportun ity wages
available were low.
C.

The Results

Table IV reports on the results of the four child investmen t
regressio ns; Tables II and III define the symbols and provide the
sources of the variables used.
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In general, the household production pararneters,together
with the selected control variables, account for over 50% of the
interstate variation in each of the four measures of chi~d in
vestment and the signs and statistical significance of the co
effecients are consistent with the implications derived from the
formal model of part I.

The most striking characteristic of the

set of equations is the dominance of female over male variables.
In all cases but one, the schooling and wage coefficients pertain
ing to males are not significantly different from zero, while all
of the coefficients of the household production parameters per
taining to women at least approach statistical significance.
Thus, the results confirm the notion that it is women who supply
the most time to child investment in the home.
a-

Child Quantity- Fertility
The significant negative effect of the female wage on family

size is consistent with the assl.Dllption that child services require
more of the wife's time per unit of output than other commodities
produced in the household.

High levels of the wife's education

are also associated with lower fertility, a result which seems to
support the hypothesis that female schooling and contraceptive
efficiency are positively correlated.

The recent decline in birth

rates can thus be attributed to increases in both female educational
attainment, which would shrink discrepencies between desired and
actual fertility, and female wage rates, which would lead to a
decline in the desired number of children, who require relatively
large amounts of more expensive female time.
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While.th e wage of the husband has no effect on fertilit y, because
of the small particip ation of the husband in househo ld producti on
and the relative ly even distribu tion of his time among consump tion
activiti es in the househo ld, male schoolin g levels are positiv ely,
but weakly, correlat ed with family size.

Increase s in the educa

tional attainm ent of both males and females by 10% results in a
net reductio n in fertilit y of 7.5%; the negative female educatio n
effect dominat es the positive influenc e of male schoolin g.
The negative and signific ant coeffic ient for NONW seems to
indicate that, for given levels of parenta l educatio n and wage
rates, urban non-whi tes bear less children than urban whites.
The effect of the compuls ory schoolin g laws

on· family size, while in the

predicte d negative directio n, is not signific antly differen t from
zero.

The reason for the lack of influenc e of these laws on fertilit y

may be their failure to raise school enrollm ent rates, and thus
child quality , by signific ant amounts .
b.

Male and Female Child Quality- Sex-spe cific School Enrollm ent Rates
Female wages are also negativ ely and signific antly correlat ed

with the child quality variabl es, indicati ng that rises in the
wages of women will lower the demand for the quality of children
because of the wife's time intensit y of child investm ent.

The

observed upward trend in school enrollm ent rates, is due to the much
stronge r positive (approac hing signific ance) influenc e of the school
ing level of women.

The relative ly strong positive effect of female

educatio nal attainm ent (EDF) may be due to the negative impact
of female schoolin g on the quantity of children , as was found in
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the CEB regression, which would raise desired levels of quality
per child, the positive effect of schooling on the productivity
of the wife's time on household production, which would lower the
cost of time-intensive child investment

more than other com'""

modities, and/or a positive correlation between schooling and
tastes for high quality children.

Because of the strength of

the positive education effect, increases in schooling and earnings
of women would, ori net, thus result in an increase in the demand
for child quality.
The rise in both male and female teen-age enrollment rates from
1960 to 1970, depicted in Table I, can thus be explained by the
influence of rises in the schooling of f,emale parents.

The

higher level of male and the greater increse in female school
enrollment rates during this period can also be accounted for by
the results obtained.

Only two variables in the male and female

quality equations have significantly different coefficients-- the
female wage (FW) and the compulsory schooling law variable (EDLAW).

C~teris paribus, compulsory schooling laws appear to affect only
male teen-age school enrollment; the coefficient of this variable
is positive and approaches significance in the male enrollment
equation, but is not significantly different from zero in the female
child quality regression.

Thus the impact of compulsory schooling

legislation may account somewhat for the higher level of the male
school enrollment rate.
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That the negative influence of the wife's wage rate on female
school enrollment is significantly less strong than its effect on
male school enrollment is supportive of the hypothesis that male
and female children are treated differently in the home.

It will

be recalled that the model formulated in part I predicts~ just such
a result for the female wage under the assumption of the greater
time intensity of-male than female child quality; the desired level
of male child quality will increase less than that of female child
quality because male children

require more of the wife's time

per unit of quality produced.

Alternatively, of course, the pre

dicted changes in the levels of male and female child quality may
reflect a correlation between preferences for sex-specific levels
of child quality and female earnings.
The_ other coefficients obtained in the school enrollment
equations indicate that whites and non-whites do not differ in their
demand for child quality and that low levels of infant mortality
are associated with high levels of quality investment in children.
The latter result is consistent· with the hypothesis that parents
are more willing to invest in children the higher the probability
of their survival to adulthood.
The positive effect of the unemployment rate on school enrollment~
reflecting the influence of the probability of obtaining employment
alternative to schooling, is consistent with expectations, but the
positive coefficient of the opportunity wage variable is contrary
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to the directi on of influen ce predict ed and is a puzzle .29
c.

Inputs to Child Qualit y-- School Expend itures

The EXP equatio n represe nts the derived demand for one type
of input used in child investm ent.

The positiv e and signifi cant

effect of the wife's wage on school expend itures thus appears to
reflec t the strengt h of the substit ution effect in the produc tion
of child quality -- increas es in the price of time of women lead to
the substit ution of purcha sed goods for time, per unit of child
quality produc ed, which more than offsets the weak negativ e relatio n
between women's wages and the demand for the level of child quality .
The insigni ficance of the female educati on coeffic ient may be due
to the strong offsett ing influen ce of the positiv e consum ption
effect of the wife's educat ion, as eviden t in the child quality
regress ions.

Increas es in the schooli ng of women both strong ly

increas e the demand for the level of child quality and, given the
positiv e effect of educati on on the produc tivity of time in the
home, induce substit ution away from goods to more produc tive time
in the produc tion of each unit of child quality .

The level and

input substit ution effects of female school ing, of opposi te sign
and, perhap s , of equal strengt h ,

thus may offset each other.

That the coeffic ients of the male wage and school itgvari ables
in the EXP regress ion are not signifi cantly differe nt from zero,
howeve r, is furthe r evidenc e of the small amount of time supplie d
by the husband to househ old child investm ent since the effects
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of these variables on the level of child quality were also
insignificant.

Increases in schooling expenditures per pupil may

thus be attributed to the substitution of wive's household child
investment time for goods as women's wages have risen.
Conclusion
The principal general conclusions that can be made on the basis
of the foregoing theoretical and empirical analysis are that the
levels and movements in family size, male and female enrollment
rates, and per-pupil school expenditures are the joint manifestations of child investment decisions made within the family;
that it is the set of parameters associated with the wife's time,
principally her wage and education,which dominate these decisions,
and that some differential investment in children with respect to
sex occurs within the household.

A continuation of the upward

trends in the education and wage rates of women should result in
further declines in fertility, continued increases in school enrollment
rates, but at a faster pace for female than for male teen-agers, and a
continued rise in educational expenditures because of the time-intensity
of household child services production.
These conclusions and the results on which they are based must
remain tentative, however, because the male-female allocation of
time between household production activities and the division of
labor between home and market work may change in the future so that
women may cease to be dominant in household child investment.
In addition, the evidence of child investment differences between
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male and female children requires further exploration, particularly
as regards whether those differences can be attributed to tech
nological factors in child quality production or are the result of
the preferences of the parents, and if the latter, to what extent
they are rational

parental responses to sex differentials in the

rates of return to child quality that derive from the economic
structure of society.
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T,able I :

Urban Teen Age Schoo l Enrol lment Rates ,
Male and Femal es Aged 15-18

1960

1970

% Change

Male

•7586

.8436

11.0

Femal e

.6979

.8023

17.5

Sourc es:

(1)
U.S. Burea u of the Censu s, Census of Popu lation 1960,PC
2D - 52D, Table 103
Census of Popul ation 1970,
11
"Spec ial Repo rt-- Schoo l Enrol lment •

I
i

Table II:

Variable Used in Child Investmen t Regressio ns
Urban Populatio n

Symbol

Definitio n

Dependent Variables
CEB
ENRM
ENRF
EXP

Children ever born per 1000 maried women aged 35-44
School enrollmen t rate of males aged 15-18
School enrollmen t rate of female$ag ed 15-18
Total current public school expenditu res per
pupil attending school in urban districts

Independe nt Variables
FW
MW
EDF
EDM
EDLAW

Weekly income of women aged 35-44
Weekly income of males aged 35-44
Median years of schooling of women aged 35-44
Median year:of schooling of males aged 35-44
Minimum state lawful school - leaving age

IM

Infant mortality rate in urban areas, average
ann ml infant births per 1000 births for
1950-59

N~NW

Percent of urban populatio n aged 35-44 non-white
Median age of non-agric ultural employed males

AGE
U

Unemployment rate of urban populatio n aged
15-24

DPW

Wage rate of non-agric ultural unskilled workers,
average for 1950-59.

C

Constant term.

Number of observati ons= 47; Rhode Island, Alaska, Hawaii excluded.

Table III:

Sources of Variables

Children ever born: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population 1960,
PC(l) 2D-52D; Table 113.
Enrollment rates:_______ ; Tables 101 and 102.
School expenditures: U.S. Office of Education, Biennial Survey·of Education
in the United States, 1964-56, "Statistics of Local School Systems-
Staff, Pupils, and Finances;" Chapter 3, Section IV; Table O for
38 states; Chapter 3, Section III; Table 3 and 4 for 6 states
having country-unit systems, groups I and II.
Weekly wages: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population 1960,
PC(l) 2D-52D; Median income, Table 134; Weeks worked computed
from Table 118.
Schoolin~: _ _ _ _ _ _ ; Table 103.
Compulsory schooling law: U.S. Office of Education, Circular Number 793,
State Law on Compulsory Attendance.
Infant mortality: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Vital Statistics, ''National
Summaries," 1950-59.
Proportion non-white: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population
1960, PC(l) 2D-52D; Table 103.
Age: _ _ _ _ _ _ ; Table 187.
Unemployment rate: _______ ; Table 176.
Opportunity wage:

U.S. Department of Labor, Statistical Yearbook, 1960.

Table IV:

Regression Results

\

Ct-values in parentheses)
Dependent Variables

CEB

ENRM

EXP

ENRF

Independent
Variables

FW

-5.865
(1.66)*

-.01092
(3.07)*

-.00421
(2.149)Ji!

3.07015
( 3.46) *

MW

3.259
(0.63)

.00127
(0.14)

.00024
(0.05)

.22782
( 0 .16)

EDF

-495.3
(1. 84)*

.30837
(1.28)*

.23979
(1.34)~

-19.7702
(0.25)

EDM

337. 8 *
(1.63)

-.01299
(0.05)

.00022
(0. 00)

21.9366
(0. 37)

-.002373
(0.47)

-2.70668
(1.06)

EDLAW

-3.613
(0.92)

.01399
(1.33) *

-20.78
(1.95)*

(2.14)11t.

-.01221
(2.16).

-1.4937
(0.58)

NONW

-14.94
(2.25)~

-.00170
(0.30)

.00164
(0.53)

.138555
(0.10)

AGE

-84.52 *
(3.64)

-.04134
(1.46)*

-.01348
(0. 86)

-1. 23294
(0.179)

u

.03529
(1.65)~

.01406
(1.19)

OPW

.52233
(1.69)*

.27810
(1.64)*

.08982
(0.04)

-.65804
(0.58)

.6471

.6323

IM.

C

R2

.9434
(4.74)
.5323

-.02204

* Significant at 10 percent level with a one-tailed test.

.6455
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Footnotes

1 Malkiel and Malkiel ( 197 3)
and Mincer and Polachek ( 197 3) are the
most recent examples.
2Becker

(1960) was the first to consider the demand for the quantity

and quality of children in the context of the family •. More recently,
Willis (1973), Becker and Lewis (1973), and DeTray (1973) have developed
models of child investment.

In none of these studies is a distinction

made between male and female quality.
3

DeTray is an exception.

serious flaws.

His empirical analysis, however, contains

See note 2 7.

4·

In real terms, current expenditures per pupil in average daily atten-

dance in public elementary and secondary schools rose from 525 dollars in
1959-1960 to 889 dollars in 1969-1970.

Source:

Office of Education, U.S.

Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Digest of Educational Statistics 1972, Table 77.
5

6

For simplicity it will be assumed that O <f < 1.
The linear homogeneity of the household production functions

has been assumed.
7Tb.

•
•
• •
is assumption
is
not unrealistic.

years of age

In 1960, of the women 30-45

who were not currently in the labor force, over 85% had

previous work experience.

\

8see Willis (1973) for a
detailed discussion of why efficient
household production requires the equality of the value of the marginal
product of the wife's time in the production of each household commodity
with her market wage.
9
Michael (1973) prcvides evidence that the schooling of women is
positively correlated with the efficiency of the contraceptive technique
chosen.
10

see May and Heer (1968) and Ben-Porath and Welch (1972).

11

In the aggregate population, the larger families would be those

with relatively more girls; large f families would thus dominate large
(1-f) families, raising f above 1-f.
12
13

For a rigorous analysis of this point see Becker and Lewis (1973).
All references to the effects of changes in the shadow prices

in the rest of the text will assume the constancy of the real income of the
family; changes in the child investment variables in· response to shadow
price variations will thus be "compensated" effects.
14

The definition of parent's "time-value share", which will also be

referred to as "earnings share" or "time-value intensity" is:
t .. w.
1J

1

,

h

were

•

1

= W,H,

•

J

= S, CF, CM

'IT •

J

15

In general, E
=
a,b

oa

b

ob

a

where a= one of the commodities,

b = one of the household production parameters or prices.

16 While second-order conditions for the maximization of utility

imply that increases in the nM or nF decrease the demand for male and
female child services, and that both the quality and quantity
elasticities cannot be positive, either E
NF(M) 'TIF(M)'
, may be greater than zero.
,
or E
TIF(M)
QF(M)

The model thus does not

predict how changes in the demand for child services are distributed
between the quantity and quality of children.
11see Smith (1972)~

18 Th"
. " tye ff ec t o f e d ucat"ion
. 1 ar k"in d o f h ome pro d uctivi
i s particu
is thus neutral between commodities but non-neutral between production
inputs; the marginal productivities of the goods inputs are assumed to
be unaffected by the wife's schooling.
19

Thus, if the time spent by the husband in the household production

of child services is small, changes in his price of time would have
only a negligible effect on the demand for child investment market goods.
20

rn particular, the analysis implies that family size would only

have an independent influence on quality per child to the extent that par
ents did not have significant control over fertility.

When the family

size variable was included in the child quality equations its coefficient
did not attain significance.
21

For example, while it is theoretically possible for the female wage

coefficient to be positive in either the fertility or child quality regressions,
a positive wage coefficient in both equations would represent a contradiction
of one prediction of the model.

22 The child
investm ent behavio r of farm families is signific antiy
differen t from that of urban families and urban income variable s are not
compati ble with those pertaini ng to the farm populat ion.

Thus, the

data used here are purged of the errors-i n-varia bles and specific ation
error due to these occupat ional effects.
23

For evidenc e, see Rosenzw eig (1974).

For a detailed discussi on of the advantag es (and shortcom ings)

of using aggrega te data to estimate fertilit y behavio r, see Cain and
Weining er (1973).
24
25

see Willis (1973) for a detailed analysis of this point.

The enrollme nt rates of these age groups were chosen because the

intersta te variatio n in the rates of the school-a ge populat ion below the
age of 15 was negligib le.
26
27

See Ben-Por ath (1967)
DeTray tests the child quality implica tions of his model with a

measure of quality per child that contains both school expendi tures and en
rollmen t.

By combinin g inputs and output in one variabl e, he is led to

the erroneou s conclusi on that child quality is not female time-int ensive.
However , the evidence obtained here (section e) for per-pup il expendi tures
and enrollm ent indicate that DeTray's result represe nts the net offsetti ng
effects of the signific ant negative child quality and positive expendi ture
effects of the wife's price of time.
28
29

see Mincer and Polachek (1973).
0ne possible explana tion is that these wages may be positive ly

correla ted with the returns to educatio n.

